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THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY v.
SHALALA: DOLLARS OR SENSE? THE
ILLOGICAL RESTRICTION OF MEDICARE'S
FUNDING OF GRADUATE
MEDICAL EDUCATION
Contemporary medical education includes four years of medical school
followed by at least three years of residency training.1 The four years of
medical school, referred to as undergraduate medical education,2 consist
of clinical clerkships as well as classroom instruction in the basic sci-
ences.3 Upon completion of medical school and receipt of a medical de-
gree, most physicians participate in residency training programs, referred
to as graduate medical education ("GME").4 GME provides residents
the opportunity to work with patients in a structured and supervised
clinical education environment.5 While undergraduate medical education
is mostly conducted in the classrooms of the medical school, residents are
trained in the hospital setting.6 Accordingly, hospitals must hire qualified
doctors in various specialties to supervise the program's residents.7 These
1. Medical Education Funding by Medicare. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health
of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1984) [hereinafter Medical Edu-
cation Funding].
2. This is referred to as undergraduate medical education despite the fact that most
medical students have graduated from an undergraduate institution. Medical Education
Passthrough: Hearing on S.1158 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1985) [hereinafter Medical Education Passthrough].
3. Id at 8-9. Clinical education introduces medical students to the various specialties
of clinical medicine. Medical Education Funding, supra note 1, at 6. Third year students
are traditionally required to spend a specific amount of time in the areas of internal
medicine, surgery, obstetrics/gynecology, psychiatry, and pediatrics. Id. Fourth year stu-
dents take elective clerkships providing either additional expertise in the basic specialties
or introductions into other specialties. Id.
4. Medical Education Passthrough, supra note 2, at 9. Currently, there are approxi-
mately 7,000 accredited GME programs. Carlos J.M. Martini, MD, MPH, MSc, Graduate
Medical Education in the Changing Environment of Medicine, 268 JAMA 1097, 1097
(1992). These programs are located at more than 1,300 teaching hospitals and train more
than 80,000 residents. Lelia B. Helms et al., Litigation in Medical Education: Retrospect
and Prospect, 11 J. CoNmMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 317, 322 (1995).
5. Medical Education Passthrough, supra note 2, at 9.
6. Medical Education Funding, supra note 1, at 6.
7. Ohio State Univ. v. Sullivan, 777 F. Supp. 582, 587 (S.D. Ohio 1991), affd, 996
F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2731, and vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
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doctors require administrative and clerical staffs, office space, and sup-
plies.8 The costs for each of these items, as well as compensation to the
residents, comprise a portion of the cost of the educational activity.'
Such expenses, classified as traditional and customary costs incurred by a
teaching hospital's GME program,10 are the type of costs Congress in-
tended for Medicare to reimburse.1
Medicare,"2 the federally funded health insurance program for the eld-
erly and disabled, is the primary means through which the federal govern-
ment finances GME.13  While Medicare has been instrumental in
improving the status of our nation's health care, 14 the program is severely
In addition to training physicians, hospitals offer educational programs for a broad array of
health care specialties including nursing, occupational therapy, pharmacy, physical therapy,
and x-ray technology. 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(e) (1994). A teaching hospital's customary or
traditional role for these training programs will vary depending upon the kind of activity
involved. Ohio State Univ., 777 F. Supp. at 587.
8. Ohio State Univ., 777 F. Supp. at 587; see also Medical Education Passthrough,
supra note 2, at 4 (providing that direct GME expenses include "salaries and fringe bene-
fits for residents, faculty, and support staff; the cost of conference and classroom space in
the hospital; any costs of additional equipment and supplies; and allocated overhead
costs").
9. Ohio State Univ., 777 F. Supp. at 587.
10. Id.
11. See S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1977; H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1965). At the 1965
legislative hearings, Congress instructed that until the community accepts its responsibility
to pay GME costs, "part of the net cost of such activities (including stipends of trainees as
well as compensation of teachers and other costs) should be considered as an element in
the cost of patient care, to be borne to an appropriate extent by [Medicare]." S. REP. No.
404; H.R. RaP. No. 213.
12. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291, amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
13. U.S. GENERA.L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCA-
TION PAYMENT POLICY NEEDS TO BE REEXAMINED 1 (1994). In 1992, Medicare contrib-
uted $5.2 billion to finance physician training and education. Id Federal funding of
clinical education is justified on the basis that clinical education is a public good; every
graduate of medical school should be entitled to a residency position; the federal govern-
ment should support academic medical institutions; and the federal government is respon-
sible for the quantity, diversity, and geographic distribution of physicians. See Fiscal Year
1990 Budget Issues Relating to Graduate Medical Education and its Support Under the
Medicare Program" Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways
& Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1989). But see Marc L. Rivo, MD, MPH et al., Com-
paring Physician Workforce Reform Recommendations, 270 JAMA 1083, 1083 (1993)
(claiming that Medicare's GME funding policy has failed to provide a sufficient quantity
and quality of physicians to meet our nation's health care needs).
14. Sr. Mary Jean Flaherty, S.C. & Sr. Rosemary Donley, S.C., Health Care System
Reform, 10 J. CoNrrmp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 105, 109 (1994) (footnote omitted). Medi-
care has encouraged physicians to research and treat diseases which commonly afflict the
elderly. Id. Since 1965, average life expectancy has increased by nearly three years, while
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deficient with respect to its costs, 15 particularly in the area of hospital
expenditures. 16 Hospitals providing services to Medicare beneficiaries
("Providers") are reimbursed by the Medicare program for the costs of
traditional educational activities that enhance the quality of patient
care.17 The program, however, will not pay for educational expenses "re-
suiting from [a] redistribution of costs from educational institutions... to
patient care institutions.""'
The federal government and Providers disagree over the effect of this
anti-redistribution principle on GME reimbursement.19 The Secretary of
Health and Human Services ("Secretary"), 20 in an effort to limit Medi-
care expenditures, 21 has construed the anti-redistribution regulation to
bar reimbursement for all costs previously paid by a Provider's affiliated
medical school? 2 Providers argue, however, that because GME is essen-
tial to health care, the federal government should provide reimbursement
diseases such as heart disease, stroke, and diabetes have decreased by 30%. Eleanor D.
Kinney, J.D., M.P.H., The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and Payment Disputes:
Achieving Fairness in a Tune of Constraint, 1 ADMiN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 16 (1987) (footnote
omitted). Medicare has also been successful in ensuring coverage for the elderly. At the
time of its enactment, only 56% of the elderly had health insurance. Id. at 5 (footnote
omitted). Today, more than 37 million people aged 65 and over are covered under the
Medicare plan, Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Medicare, Turning 30, Won't be What it Was,
N.Y. Tnvirs, July 23, 1995, at Al. This is the only age group in the United States with
virtually universal coverage. Id.
15. In 1995, total Medicare expenditures are estimated to exceed $153 billion, com-
prising over 10% of the federal budget. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES FISCAL Y.AR 1995 at 235
(1994). Astonishingly, the Medicare budget, by itself, is more than half the entire defense
budget. Id.
16. See Kinney, supra note 14, at 17 (footnotes omitted). Hospital services comprise
70% of all Medicare expenditures. Id. While Medicare expenditures were $4.6 billion in
1967, id., it is expected to be $215 billion in 1999, ExEcuTrvm OFFICE OF THE PREsIDENT,
supra note 15, at 235.
17. 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(a)-(b) (1994).
18. 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994).
19. See, eg., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2383-84 (1994); Ohio
State Univ. v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 996 F.2d 122,
123 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2731, and vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
20. The Secretary has the authority to prescribe Medicare regulations. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395 hh(a)(1) (1988).
21. Robin Elizabeth Margolis, HHS May Cut Medicare Payments to Teaching Hospi-
tals, 11 HEALTHSPAN 23,23 (1994). Medicare currently pays teaching hospitals $1.8 billion
annually for the salaries and fringe benefits of interns and residents, faculty salaries, and
overhead for teaching activities. Carol S. Weissert et al., Education and the Health Profes-
sions: Explaining Policy Choices Among the States, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 361,364
(1994).
22. Margolis, supra note 21, at 23.
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for all traditional GME activities, regardless of whether the activity had
previously been borne by an educational institution.23
This debate, as well as over $150 million in GME reimbursements,24
remained unsettled until the United States Supreme Court held
Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala2 5 that the anti-redistribution prin-
ciple bars a Provider from receiving federal financing for any GME ex-
pense previously absorbed by its affiliated medical school.26 In a five to
four decision,27 the Court held that the Secretary is entitled to broad def-
erence when interpreting regulations concerning "a complex and highly
technical regulatory program," such as Medicare.' Thus, the Court
found that the Secretary's interpretation was both reasonable and "faith-
ful to the regulations plain language., 29 According to the Court, the
"anti-redistribution principle lays down a bright line [test] for distinguish-
ing permissible from impermissible reimbursement: educational costs
will not be reimbursed if they are the result of a 'redistribution of costs"'
from an affiliated medical school to a Provider. 30
This Note first examines the manner in which Medicare reimburses
Providers for GME expenses. Part II investigates a court's power to re-
view the Secretary's interpretation of the anti-redistribution regulation.
Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's holding in Thomas Jefferson Uni-
versity v. Shalala and its impact on similarly situated Providers. Finally,
this Note concludes that the Secretary's interpretation is irrational in that
23. See Ohio State Univ., 996 F.2d at 124; Graduate Medical Education: Court Upholds
HHS Interpretation of Rule for Indirect GME Reimbursement, 3 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA)
No. 26, at 894 (June 30, 1994) [hereinafter GME: Court Upholds HHS Interpretation] (stat-
ing the argument that the Secretary "wrongly interpreted the regulation to mean that if
costs had not been claimed from the beginning of the [P]rovider's participation in Medi-
care,... any attempt later to identify the costs for Medicare reimbursement constituted a
prohibited redistribution"). Those educational activities traditionally engaged in by Prov-
iders include clinical training of interns and residents. Ohio State Univ. v. Sullivan, 777 F.
Supp. 582,587 (S.D. Ohio 1991), affd, 966 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct.
2731, and vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
24. Brief for Respondent at 10-12, Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381
(1994) (No. 93-120) [hereinafter Br. for Resp't, Oct. 1993].
25. 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994).
26. Id. at 2387.
27. This is the first time that the Supreme Court has split five to four on a decision
involving Medicare. OME: Court Upholds HHS Interpretation, supra note 23, at 895.
28. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2387 (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines,
Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991)).
29. Id at 2389.
30. Id (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)).
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Providers furnishing similar benefits to their Medicare patients will re-
ceive disparate levels of reimbursement from the federal government.
I. THE MEDICARE PROGRAM
Congress enacted the federally funded Medicare program to ensure
health insurance coverage for the elderly and disabled.31 Under the pro-
gram, Medicare beneficiaries may receive treatment from any facility
which participates as a "provider of [Medicare] services."32 Accordingly,
Providers are directly reimbursed by the federal government for the costs
incurred in treating their Medicare patients.33
A. Administration of Medicare Reimbursement
Congress has delegated to the Secretary the authority to administer the
Medicare reimbursement system and promulgate regulations necessary to
govern payments to Providers.' In order for a Provider to receive fed-
eral funding, it must enter into a participation agreement with the Secre-
tary to provide services to Medicare beneficiaries.35 The Secretary then
contracts with fiscal intermediaries36 to assist with the reimbursement
process.3 7 At the end of the fiscal year, a Provider will fie a detailed cost
report with the intermediary indicating its total costs and how the costs
are to be allocated. 8 The intermediary will analyze the cost report and
prepare a written notice of program reimbursement identifying the total
31. Br. for Resp't, Oct. 1993, supra note 24, at 2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988)). The
Medicare program is divided into two parts. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Sullivan, [March-
Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 40,294, at 30,960 (E.D.
Pa. May 1, 1992), affd, 993 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994). Part A
provides coverage for institutional providers such as hospitals. Id (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395c-d). Part B creates a voluntary program of "supplementary medical insurance" cov-
ering physicians' charges and other medical services. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395k, I, x(s)).
32. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) at 30,960 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395d, x(b) (1988)).
33. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994)
(No. 93-120) [hereinafter Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994].
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh (1988).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (1988). In particular, Providers must agree "not to charge...
any individual ... for items or services for which such individual is entitled to have pay-
ment made under [Medicare]." 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(A).
36. In Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, Aetna Life Insurance Company served
as the Secretary's fiscal intermediary. See Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992
Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) at 30,960.
37. Id (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395(h) (1988)).
38. 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.20(b), 413.24(f) (1994).
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reimbursement due. 9 The notice will contain an explanation of the inter-
mediary's decision and will advise the Provider of its right to appeal.4
A Provider dissatisfied with the intermediary's decision may appeal by
requesting a hearing before the Provider Reimbursement Review Board
("PRRB").4 1 The PRRB is a tribunal within the Department of Health
and Human Services which maintains exclusive jurisdiction over Medi-
care reimbursement claims.42 Upon completion of the hearing,43 the
PRRB will issue a written decision based upon its findings from the rec-
ord.44 Any determination made by the PRRB is subject to review by the
Secretary, 5 acting through the Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA").4" The HCFA may affirm, reverse, or modify the PRRB's de-
cision.4 7 If a Provider is still dissatisfied, it may seek judicial review by
filing a civil action within sixty days after notification of the HCFA's
decision.'
B. General Cost Reimbursement Principles
Beginning in 1966, Medicare reimbursed Providers for all "reasonable
costs" incurred in providing care to Medicare beneficiaries."9 The "rea-
sonable cost" reimbursement system was computed on the basis of
"cost[s] actually incurred, excluding.., any part of incurred cost[s] found
to be unnecessary in the efficient delivery of needed health services."50
Reasonable cost reimbursement, however, offered no incentive for Prov-
39. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1803 (1994).
40. Id
41. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) at 30,961 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a) (1988)); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1835 (1994).
42. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (1988)). The PRRB is selected by the Secretary and
is comprised of five experts in the field of Medicare reimbursements. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo(h). TWo members of the PRRB must represent Providers and at least one mem-
ber must be a certified public accountant. Id
43. At the hearing, parties may present documented evidence, 42 C.F.R. § 405.1855
(1994), witnesses, 42 C.F.R. § 405.1859, and oral arguments and written briefs, 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.1861.
44. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1871 (1994).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(0(1) (1988).
46. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) at 30,961; Kinney, supra note 14, at 8.
47. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1875(g) (1994).
48.. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1877(a) (1994).
49. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) at 30,960; 42 U.S.C. § 1395 x(v)(1)(A) (1988).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1988).
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iders to be efficient in their delivery of patient care."' Rather, it nurtured
a situation in which rising costs would be met with increased levels of
reimbursement5 2
Recognizing the need to control escalating Medicare expenditures,53
Congress limited the rate at which Providers could increase their operat-
ing costs within the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
("TEF-RA").54 Providers with cost increases exceeding their "target
amount" were to be penalized; those that did not surpass this amount
were to receive a portion of the savings.55
In 1983, Congress radically restructured Medicare reimbursement by
establishing the Prospective Payment System ("PPS").56 The PPS was
enacted to enable the federal government to limit Medicare expenditures
and offer Providers a financial incentive to deliver patient care effi-
ciently.57 Under the PPS, fixed rates are assigned to the different catego-
ries of Medicare services.5 8 Payments are then made on the basis of these
predetermined rates.59 The PPS, however, allows for a pass-through pro-
51. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCII) at 30,960.
52. Id; see also H.R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1983), reprinted in 1983
U.S.C.C.A.N. 219, 351 (providing that the Prospective Payment System was established to
"reform the financial incentives hospitals face [and promote] efficiency in the provision of
services by rewarding cost/effective hospital practices").
53. From 1967 to 1985, total Medicare expenditures increased from $4.6 billion to
$62.9 billion. Kinney, supra note 14, at 17 (footnote omitted).
54. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) at 30,960.
55. For example, hospitals with operating costs less than or equal to their "target
amount" were reimbursed for those costs plus 50% of the difference between their "target
amount" and their operating costs, or 5% of the "target amount," whichever is less. 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(1)(A) (1988). However, hospitals which exceeded their "target
amount" were only reimbursed to the extent of their target rate plus 25% of the difference
between this amount and their operating costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(1)(B).
56. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) at 30,960; 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (1988).
57. See Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) at 30,960.
58. See id. In contrast to the reasonable cost reimbursement system, the PPS reim-
burses hospitals a predetermined amount for the care of Medicare beneficiaries in each of
the 490 valid diagnosis-related groups ("DRG's"). Statement on the Importance of the
Medicare Program to the Overall Financial Viability of Academic Medicare: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, available in 1995
WL 43755 (F.D.C.H.) at *5 (February 6, 1995) [hereinafter Importance of the Medicare
Program].
59. Importance of the Medicare Program, supra note 58, at *5.
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vision excluding direct GME expenses.60 Thus, direct GME costs contin-
ued to be reimbursed under the old reasonable cost system.6'
In 1986, Congress finally adopted a new payment methodology for
GME expenses. 62 As of July 1, 1985, the amount of costs a Provider in-
curred within its base year, a period ranging from fiscal year October 1,
1983, to September 30, 1984, influenced the reimbursement amount for
all subsequent years.63 Consequently, a number of Providers, 64 in an at-
tempt to maximize future reimbursements, increased their expenses for
this period by claiming costs previously paid by their affiliated medical
school.65 These increased costs form the basis of the dispute between the
60. See Medical Education Funding, supra note 1, at 88; H.R. ReP. No. 25, supra note
52, at 132, reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 359.
61. H.R. REP. No. 25, supra note 52, at 132, reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 359.
The Secretary justified the "direct medical education passthrough" provision in her 1982
report Hospital Prospective Payment for Medicare:
The Department believes that the direct costs of approved medical education
should be excluded from the rate and be reimbursed as per the present [reason-
able cost reimbursement] system. This approach will assure that the base rate is
related to a patient care outcome and not significantly influenced by factors
whose existence is really based on objectives quite apart from the care of particu-
lar patients in a particular hospital.
Medical Education Funding, supra note 1, at 88 (statement of the Association of American
Medical Colleges).
62. Brief for Respondent at 5, Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381
(1994) (No. 93-120) [hereinafter Br. for Resp't, March 19941.
63. Id. at 5-6 (citing Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9202(a), 100 Stat. 171 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)
(1988); 42 C.F.R. § 413.86(e)(1)(i)(A) (1994)). "COBRA... distinguishes between 'direct
graduate medical education costs,' which are reimbursed through the 'base year' methodol-
ogy in 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h), and 'indirect costs' associated with post-graduate training
programs, which are... reimbursed through the PPS system .... Br. for Resp't, March
1994, supra note 62, at 5 n.4 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h), ww(d)(5)(B)). In distinguish-
ing the two types of costs, the Conference Report on the COBRA stated:
The [M]edicare program provides reimbursement for both the direct and indirect
costs of medical education incurred by teaching hospitals. The direct costs of ap-
proved medical education programs (such as salaries for residents and teachers
and classroom costs) are excluded from the prospective payment system, and are
reimbursed on a reasonable cost basis. The indirect costs are increased patient
care costs associated with teaching programs due to such factors as increased di-
agnostic testing, increased numbers of procedures prescribed, higher staffing ra-
tios, and a more severely ill patient population.
Id. (quoting H.R. CoNw. REP. No. 453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 455 (1985)).
64. Approximately 30 Providers attempted to increase their Medicare expenses during
their base year and in subsequent years. See Br. for Resp't, Oct. 1993, supra note 24, at 10-
11.
65. Id.; see, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2385 (1994); Ohio
State Univ. v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 996 F.2d 122,
124-25 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2731, and vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
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Secretary and Providers concerning the interpretation of the anti-redistri-
bution regulation. 66
C. Regulations Governing GME Reimbursement
The regulations which govern the reimbursement of GME are set out
in 42 C.F.R. section 413.85.67 Section 413.85(a) codifies Congress' origi-
nal intent to reimburse Providers for GME expenses by stating that "ap-
proved educational activities" are "allowable cost[s]" for which a
Provider may receive reimbursement.' "Approved educational activi-
ties" are defined as "formally organized or planned programs of study
usually engaged in by [P]roviders in order to enhance the quality of pa-
tient care. ' 69
Section 413.85(c), the anti-redistribution regulation, provides in full
that:
Many [P]roviders engage in educational activities including
training programs for.., medical students, interns and residents
.... These programs contribute to the quality of patient care
within an institution and are necessary to meet the community's
needs for medical... personnel. It is recognized that the costs
of such educational activities should be borne by the commu-
nity. However, many communities have not assumed responsi-
bility for financing these programs and it is necessary that
support be provided by those purchasing health care. Until
communities undertake to bear these costs, the [Medicare] pro-
gram will participate appropriately in the support of these edu-
cational activities. Although the intent of the program is to share
in the support of educational activities customarily or tradition-
ally carried on by [P]roviders in conjunction with their opera-
tions, it is not intended that this program should participate in
increased costs resulting from redistribution of costs from educa-
tional institutions or units to patient care institutions or units.70
66. See generally Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2381 (considering whether sec-
tion 413.85(c) prohibits reimbursement to Providers for otherwise reimbursable costs);
Ohio State Univ., 996 F.2d at 122 (determining whether the anti-redistribution regulation
bars Providers from recovering increased Medicare expenses incurred during their base
year).
67. Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33, at 5 (footnote omitted).
68. 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(a) (1994); see also S. REP. No. 404, supra note 11, at 36, re-
printed in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1997 (providing that a portion of the cost of a Provider's
GME program should be paid for by Medicare).
69. 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(b) (1994).
70. 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
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In section 413.85(g), the Secretary has set out the formula for deter-
mining the reasonable costs of GME reimbursement.7 A Provider will
be reimbursed the net cost of the approved educational activity minus the
revenue it receives from tuition.72 In addition, under the related-organi-
zation principle, a Provider can recover the costs incurred by its affiliated
medical school in connection with the Provider's GME program, as long
as the Provider and medical school are related by common ownership.73
This regulation has been construed by the Secretary to allow a Provider
to recover expenses incurred directly by its affiliated medical school.74
The regulations presented in section 413.85 have been part of the
Medicare program since its inception.7' Despite this fact, the Secretary
never utilized the anti-redistribution regulation to deny any related-party
reimbursement claim (e.g., hospital-affiliated medical school) until the
mid-1980s.7 6 Furthermore, a formal definition of "redistribution" was
not promulgated by the Secretary until September 1992. 77 Hence, the
proper interpretation of the anti-redistribution regulation can only be de-
rived through "the relevant legislative history, the Secretary's own previ-
ous interpretations and practices, and the plain meaning of the
regulation, read in context with the entire statutory and regulatory
71. 42 CF.R. § 413.85(g) (1994).
72. Id. The net cost of an approved educational activity includes expenses such as
trainee stipends, teachers' salaries, and other "direct and indirect costs." Id.
73. 42 C.F.R. § 413.17(a) (1994); see infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
74. Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33, at 6-7. For example, the Secretary has
allowed Providers to include within its reimbursable costs such expenses as teaching faculty
salaries, a medical library, physician office space, and clerical support. Intermediary Letter,
No. 78-7 (Feb. 1978), reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Thomas Jefferson Univ.
v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994) (No. 93-120) at 65a [hereinafter Intermediary Letter].
75. Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33, at 7.
76. Id. at 7-8; Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2390-91 (1994)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33, at 8. The Secretary's definition of "redistri-
bution," which came out approximately seven years after the dispute concerning the anti-
redistribution clause originated, states:
Redistribution of costs is defined as an attempt by a [P]rovider to increase the
amount, or to expand the types, of the costs of educational activities that are
allowed for Medicare payment purposes by claiming costs that previously were
not claimed by the [P]rovider and were considered costs of an educational institu-
tion. For example, costs for a school of nursing or allied health education that
were incurred by an educational institution rather than the [P]rovider in its pro-
spective payment or rate-of-increase limit base year cost report are not allowable
costs in subsequent fiscal years.




"1. JUDICIAL REvIEW OF THE SECRETARY'S INTERPRETATION
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes a judicial
court to set aside an agency's actions when they are found to be "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law."79 An action is considered to be arbitrary and capricious when
the agency:
[R]elie[s] on factors which Congress has not intended it to con-
sider, entirely fail[s] to consider an important aspect of the prob-
lem, offer[s] an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.80
Although a court is to conduct a careful inquiry into the facts, it is not
empowered to substitute its wisdom for that of the agency.81 A court
"must give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations."'  As long as there is a rational basis for the agency's deci-
sion, a reviewing court cannot overturn the action as arbitrary and capri-
cious.8 3 Thus, the court's task is not to choose which interpretation best
serves the regulation's purpose.' 4 Rather, an agency's interpretation is
controlling unless "an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's
plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent."8 5
A. The Secretary's Interpretation Does Not Comport with the
Regulation's Plain Language
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Thomas Jefferson University v.
Shalala, the federal courts of appeals were split as to the correct interpre-
78. Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33, at 8.
79. Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2) (A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988); see, eg.,
Univ. of Cincinnati v. Bowen, 875 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Secretary's
denial of Medicare reimbursements to a Provider was inconsistent with the regulation's
intent, and therefore, not entitled to deference).
80. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
81. JACOB A. SmmiN Er AL , ADiuNisnrnAriv LAw § 51.03, at 51-118 (1994) (footnote
omitted).
82. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2386 (1994) (citing Martin v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,150 (1991); Lyng v. Payne,
476 U.S. 926, 939 (1985); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
83. Sm'Er ET A.., supra note 81, at 51-122 (footnote omitted).
84. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2386.
85. Garderbring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988).
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tation of the anti-redistribution regulation.8 6 In Ohio State University v.
Secretary, United States Department of Health and Human Services,87 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit admitted that it must
defer to the Secretary's finding as long as it is "reasonable, consistent,
and persuasive.""8 Nevertheless, the court refused to accord such defer-
ence, finding the Secretary's interpretation in conflict with the regula-
tion's plain meaning.8 9
The Ohio State University court focused on the precise words of the
regulation; namely, the program's intent to share in the support of "edu-
cational activities customarily or traditionally carried on by
[P]roviders."90 From this language, the court concluded that section
413.85(c) bars the redistribution of only certain kinds of costs; specifi-
cally, those costs related to non-traditional activities, such as classroom
expenses.9' However, according to the court, if the costs incurred relate
to the clinical training of physicians, and therefore involve patient care,
reimbursement should never be denied. 92
B. Affording Deference to the Secretary's Interpretation
In Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,93 a case virtually identical to
Ohio State University, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reached an entirely opposite conclusion.9" Upon reviewing the
86. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 993 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct.
2381 (1994); Ohio State Univ. v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., 996 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2731, and vacated, 114 S. Ct.
2731 (1994).
87. 996 F.2d 122 (1993).
88. ld. at 123-24 (citing Whiteside v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 834 F.2d
1289, 1292 (6th Cir. 1987)).
89. Id. at 124.
90. Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)).
91. Id. The court distinguished between a Provider's GME program, which trains phy-
sicians by having them perform medical services, and a medical school's educational pro-
gram which takes place in the classroom. Id.
92. Id. According to the appellate court, the underlying purpose of the anti-redistribu-
tion regulation is to "limit reimbursement to educational costs related to patient care and
to deny reimbursement for educational costs unrelated to patient care." Id. (quoting Ohio
State Univ. v. Sullivan, 777 F. Supp. 582,587 (S.D. Ohio 1991), affd, 996 F.2d 122 (6th Cir.
1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2731, and vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994)).
93. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 993 F.2d at 879.
94. Id. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision without opinion. Id.
Thus, the appellate court adopted the views of the lower court. See Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Sullivan, [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
40,294 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 1992), affd, 993 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2381
(1994).
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plain language of the anti-redistribution regulation, the court found the
Secretary's interpretation reasonable, and therefore entitled to defer-
ence. 9- In reaching its conclusion, the court acknowledged the regula-
tion's intent that Medicare subsidize traditional educational activities
conducted by Providers.96 Equally clear to the court, however, was the
regulation's desire that Medicare not "participate in increased costs re-
sulting from redistribution of costs from educational institutions ... to
patient care institutions." 97 Consequently, the Third Circuit held that the
Secretary was correct in concluding that the regulation admits of only one
construction:
[I]f the costs of activities customarily and traditionally carried
on by [P]roviders . . .have been absorbed by an educational
unit, such costs may not later be redistributed to a patient care
unit. It is clear that what the regulation prohibits is the "redistri-
bution of costs." Any other interpretation would clearly run
afoul of the principle that a regulation will be construed to give
effect to its plain meaning.98
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN THOMAS JEFFERSON
UNIVERSITY V. SHALALA
In Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,99 the United States Supreme
Court resolved the split among the circuits and affirmed the Secretary's
interpretation of the anti-redistribution regulation.' 0 The Court con-
cluded that the Secretary's construction is not only plausible, but "it is the
most sensible [reading] the language will bear."'' According to the
Court, the meaning of section 413.85(c) is "straightforward:"' 1 2 its first
clause identifies the scope of reimbursable expenses (i.e., traditional edu-
95. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) at 30,966.
96. Id. at 30,963; S. REP. No. 404, supra note 11, at 36, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 1977; see also St. John's Hickey Memorial Hosp. v. Califano, 599 F.2d 803, 808 (7th Cir.
1979) (finding Congress clearly expressed its intent that educational activities which en-
hance the quality of patient care should be supported by Medicare), questioned on other
grounds in, Homemakers North Shore, Inc., v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 413 (1987).
97. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCII) at 30,966 (emphasis omitted) (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)).
98. Id. at 30,966. According to the court, the regulation does not distinguish between
academic and clinical training of physicians for the purposes of determining reimbursable
expenses. Id. at 30,964.
99. 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994).
100. Id. at 2384.
101. Id at 2387.
102. Id.
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cational activities); while its second clause provides that the costs of such
activities will not be reimbursed if they result from a shift of costs from an
educational to a patient care facility. 10 3
A. Case History
Thomas Jefferson University Hospital ("Hospital") is a 700 bed teach-
ing hospital which operates a Medicare-approved GME program. 1°4
Although the GME program takes place in the Hospital, it is conducted
by members of the University's College of Medicine ("Medical
School").105 The Hospital and the Medical School are commonly owned
by the University, and thus, are "related organizations" within the Medi-
care regulations.10 6
Although the Hospital has provided services to Medicare beneficiaries
since the program's inception, -it did not seek reimbursement for any
GME costs until 1974.107 From 1974 to 1983, however, the Hospital
claimed and received reimbursement for three salary-related GME costs:
(1) salaries paid directly by the Hospital to the faculty of the Medical
School for services provided to the Hospital's Medicare patients; (2) sala-
ries paid directly to residents; and (3) funds transferred internally from
the Hospital to the Medical School compensating the Medical School's
faculty for the training of the Hospital's residents.08
In 1985, in an attempt to refine its cost-finding techniques, the Hospital
hired a national accounting firm to identify all GME related expenses for
which it may have been eligible for repayment. 10 9 The accounting firm
concluded that during fiscal year 1985, the Hospital had incurred GME
program costs totalling more than $8.8 million." 0 This figure included
nearly $2.9 million in expenses directly incurred by the Medical School
103. It.
104. Id. at 2385.
105. Br. for Resp't, Oct. 1993, supra note 24, at 4.
106. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2385 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.17(a) (1994)); see
also infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text (explaining the related-organization regula-
tion's impact on the meaning of the anti-redistribution principle). Under the related-or-
ganization regulation, a Provider is entitled to repayment for the costs incurred by its
affiliated medical school. 42 C.F.R. § 413.17(a).
107. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2385.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. hia The GME costs amounted to approximately $6.6 million while administrative
costs amounted to nearly $2.2 million. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Sullivan, (March-Sept.
1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) I 40,294, at 30,962 (E.D. Pa.
May 1, 1992), affd, 993 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994).
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which had not previously been claimed by the Hospital."1 Significantly,
the Hospital's fiscal year 1985112 coincided with the new base year reim-
bursement methodology established in 1986.113 Thus, the amount reim-
bursed to the Hospital during this period would influence its level of
reimbursement for all subsequent years.'1 4
Acting under the accounting firm's guidance, the Hospital submitted its
claim to the fiscal intermediary seeking reimbursement for the entire $8.8
million." 5 The intermediary, however, denied the Hospital's claim and
allowed repayment for only those costs that had been reimbursed in prior
years." 6 The intermediary concluded that the increased costs proposed
by the Hospital constituted an improper attempt to shift costs from the
Medical School in violation of the anti-redistribution regulation."17
On November 17, 1989, the PRRB reversed the decision of the inter-
mediary and allowed reimbursement for the full $8.8 million." 8 The
PRRB noted that although the term "redistribution" is not defined by the
regulations, its use within section 413.85(c) is prefaced by a clause which
states that the Medicare program will share in the support of traditional
educational activities."19 Based on this language, the PRRB concurred
with the "[Hospital's] interpretation that the focus of the regulation with
respect to redistribution is on educational 'activities,' and not the 'cost'
associated with the activity.' 120 Accordingly, the PRRB concluded that
the Hospital's claim for additional support for its GME program did not
constitute a redistribution of costs from the Medical School to the
111. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2385.
112. The Hospital's fiscal year 1985 extended from July 1, 1984, to June 30, 1985. Br.
for Resp't, March 1994, supra note 62, at 5-6.
113. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2385; see also supra notes 62-66 and accompa-
nying text.
114. Br. for Resp't, Oct. 1993, supra note 24, at 6; Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at
2385.
115. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2385.
116. Br. for Resp't, Oct. 1993, supra note 24, at 5.
117. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Sullivan, [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare
& Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 40,294, at 30,962 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 1992), affd, 993 F.2d 879
(3d Cir. 1993), aff d, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994).
118. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Medicare
& Medicaid Guide (CCH) I 38,276, at 21,536 (Nov. 17, 1989), modified, [Oct.-Sept. 1989-
90 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 38,353 (Jan. 18, 1990), affd,
[March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 40,294 (E.D.
Pa. May 1, 1992), affld, 993 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994).
119. Id. at 21,543.
120. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)).
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Hospital.121
On January 18, 1990, the Secretary, acting through the HCFA, modi-
fied the PRRB's decision.122 The Secretary observed that under the pass-
through provision of the PPS,123 Providers "were attempting to claim
[GME] costs not previously the responsibility of the Provider or reim-
bursed by Medicare."' 24 According to the Secretary, this practice consti-
tuted an improper shift of costs from a medical school to a Provider's
GME program.' 5 Moreover, the Secretary turned to the community
support language of section 413.85(c) as a means of denying repayment to
the Hospital.126 The Secretary reasoned that the Hospital's failure to
claim these costs in previous years indicated community support for these
activities." 7 According to the Secretary, "[t]he Medicare [program] was
enacted to provide a hospital insurance and basic protection against the
costs of hospital care for the aged, and not intended to subsidize medical
education programs already supported by the community."'128 Therefore,
the Secretary stated that:
To allow the community to withdraw that support and pass these
costs to the Medicare program would result in a redistribution
of costs in violation of 42 C.F.R. 413.85(c). It would [also] be the
precise activity Congress intended to prevent. To allow it would
121. Id According to the PRRB, the additional costs claimed by the Hospital were
attributable to a refinement of cost-finding techniques and were not a prohibited redistri-
bution. Id
122. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., [Oct.-Sept. 1989-90 Transfer
Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 38,353 (Jan. 18, 1990), affd, [March-Sept.
1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 40,294 (E.D. Pa. May 1,
1992), affd, 993 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994).
123. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (providing an explanation of the
pass-through provision).
124. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [Oct.-Sept. 1989-90 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medi-
caid Guide (CCII) at 22,022 (footnote omitted).
125. Id
126, Id at 22,023. Specifically, the community support language of section 413.85(c)
states that:
[T]he costs of... educational activities should be borne by the community. How-
ever, many communities have not assumed responsibility for financing these pro-
grams and it is necessary that support be provided by those purchasing health
care. Until communities undertake to bear these costs, the [Medicare] program
will participate appropriately in the support of these [educational] activities.
42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994).
127. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [Oct.-Sept. 1989-90 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medi-
caid Guide (CCH) at 22,023.
128. IaL Congress intended that until communities provide support for GME expenses,
Medicare should assist in the financing of GME as part of its commitment to patient care.
Id.
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encourage the community to abdicate its commitment to educa-
tion to an insurance program intended to provide care for the
elderly.129
The district court affirmed the Secretary's decision.1 30 Applying a
plain meaning approach, the court held that in order to qualify for reim-
bursement four conditions must be met.1 31 First, the costs must be in-
curred in connection with the clinical training of residents. 32 Second, the
program must enhance the quality of patient care within the hospital. 33
Third, the educational costs must not have previously been paid for by
the community.'" Finally, the costs must not have been shifted from a
medical school to a hospital.1 35 The court held that the Hospital had vio-
lated both the community support and anti-redistribution conditions.136
In addressing the community support issue, the court deferred to the
HCFA's decision that the increased costs claimed by the Hospital had
previously been paid by the community.1 37 The court also rejected the
Hospital's argument that a Provider may look to Medicare for increased
support when its community support decreases.138 According to the
court, the regulation's plain language and the statute's legislative history
"express [Congress'] intent that the costs of medical educational pro-
grams should be borne by the community,"'1 39 and that Medicare would
"participate... in the support of these activities" only "until... commu-
nities undertake to bear these costs."' 40 Furthermore, the court looked
129. Id.
130. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Sullivan, [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare
& Medicaid Guide (CCH) 40,294, at 30,967 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 1992), affd, 993 F.2d 879
(3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994).





136. Id. at 30,967.
137. Id. at 30,965. According to the HCFA, community support consists of "any source
of funding other than the Medicare program," 1d. at 30,964, including "tuition and fees,
Federal appropriations, Federal grants and contracts, private gifts, grants and contracts,
endowment income, investment income and other income," it at 30,965 (quoting Univ. of
Minn. Hosps. & Clinics v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Assoc., [ransfer Binder) Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) '1 39,420, at 26,828 (May 29, 1991)). The Secretary based her defi-
nition of community support on "commonsense as well as the principles of cost reimburse-
ment promulgated by the American Hospital Association." lit at 30,964.
138. Id. at 30,965.
139. I&
140. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)). Thus, the court concluded that
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to the restructuring of the Medicare reimbursement system in 1983141 as
proof of Congress' desire to limit "the spiraling costs of the Medicare
program to prevent exhaustion of the fund and achiev[e] a level of budget
neutrality."1 4 Consequently, the court concluded that to allow the shift-
ing of costs traditionally paid for by another source to the Medicare pro-
gram would clearly oppose the congressional intent.143
With respect to the redistribution issue, the court rejected the Hospi-
tal's argument "that the [anti-]redistribution principle operates to pro-
hibit only the impermissible shifting of 'activities' . . . and does not apply
to the shifting of 'costs."' ' " Rather, the court agreed with the Secretary
that if "the costs... [had] been absorbed by an educational unit, such
costs may not later be redistributed to a patient care unit."' 45 Thus, de-
spite the Hospital's contention that their increased claim "represented a
refinement of its cost-finding techniques rather than a redistribution of
costs," the court agreed with the Secretary's conclusion that "the in-
creased claim for reimbursement represent[ed] an impermissible redistri-
bution of CoStS.' 1 46
The Hospital appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 47 The appellate court affirmed
the district court's decision without opinion.1'8 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.' 49 Justice Ken-
"[n]othing in the regulation suggests... that a [P]rovider may seek to compensate for a
decline in community support by escalating costs claimed from the Medicare program." Id.
141. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
142. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) at 30,965; H.R. REP. No. 25, supra note 52, at 132, reprinted in 1983
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 351.
143. Thomas Jefferson Univ., [March-Sept. 1992 Tkansfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) at 30,965.
144. Id. at 30,966 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)).
145. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)).
146. Id. But see Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., [1989-90 Transfer
Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 38,276, at 21,543 (Nov. 17, 1989) (holding
that a failure to identify costs in the past should not "prohibit the correction of this [cost
accounting] error"), modified, [Oct.-Sept. 1989 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) 38,353 (Jan. 18, 1990), affd, [March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare
& Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 40,294 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 1992), aff d, 993 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.
1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994).
147. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 993 F.2d 879,879 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct.
2381 (1994).
148. It
149. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2389 (1994).
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nedy, writing for the majority of five justices,15° held that because the
Secretary's interpretation was consistent with the anti-redistribution reg-
ulation's plain language, deference should be afforded and reimburse-
ment should be denied.15 ' The Court, however, did not rule on the
Secretary's construction of the community support principle because, ac-
cording to the Court, the anti-redistribution clause alone was sufficient to
deny reimbursement.1 2
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas153 focused on the words of sec-
tion 413.85(c) which state that the "intent of the [Medicare] program is to
share in the support of educational activities customarily or traditionally
carried on by [P]roviders."' 4 The test for reimbursement, according to
the dissent, is not whether a particular hospital "has traditionally claimed
and been allowed" repayment for a specific category of reimbursable
costs, 5 5 but "whether the educational activities for which reimbursement
is sought are of a type 'customarily or traditionally' engaged in by
[P]roviders."'' 6 If the answer to the question is no, then it would be a
prohibited redistribution."5 7 However, if the costs involve educational
activities traditionally engaged in by Providers, and thus enhance the
quality of patient care, no redistribution occurs when these costs are
reimbursed.' 58
B. The Majority's Approach: Strict Compliance with Administrative
Law Principles
In obeying the arbitrary and capricious standard and exercising a defer-
ential approach, the Court refused to contemplate which interpretation of
the anti-redistribution clause best serves the regulation's purpose.'5 9
Rather, the Court simply focused on whether an "alternative reading of
the [anti-redistribution] principle is compelled by the regulation's plain
language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of
150. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Blackmun,
Scalia, and Souter. Id. at 2383.
151. Id. at 2389.
152. Id. at 2387.
153. Justice Thomas was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsberg. Id. at
2389 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2394; 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994).
155. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2394 (citation omitted).
156. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2386.
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the regulation's promulgation."' 60
The Hospital, anticipating the Court's position, presented three argu-
ments16' as to why a deferential stance was inappropriate: 62 (1) the Sec-
retary's interpretation of the regulation is contrary to its plain
meaning;163 (2) the Secretary's construction violated her own internal
policies;"6 and (3) the Secretary's current adaptation of the anti-redistri-
bution principle contradicts previous applications of the regulation by the
Department of Health and Human Services ("Department"). 165
1. The Secretary's Interpretation Is Inconsistent with Its Plain
Meaning
In its first argument, the Hospital asserted that the plain meaning of
the regulation is to prohibit the reimbursement of costs for nontraditional
GME activities (e.g., classroom training), but to allow reimbursement for
costs of activities traditionally engaged in by Providers (e.g., clinical train-
ing).' 66 According to the Hospital, the regulation's prohibition against
the shifting of costs is prefaced by a sentence that begins, "the intent of
the program is to share in the support of educational activities customa-
rily or traditionally carried on by [P]roviders.' 167 Because the Hospital
had operated its GME program well before the inception of Medicare,1
68
it contended that it was entitled to recover the "direct and indirect costs
160. Id. at 2386-87 (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)).
161. An additional argument was presented by the Hospital based on the aspirational
language of section 413.85(c). See id at 2389; infra note 203.
162. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2387.
163. Id at 2388; Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33, at 20; infra notes 166-72 and
accompanying text.
164. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2388; Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33,
at 21; infra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
165. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2391; Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33,
at 21; infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
166. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2388; Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33,
at 20. In other words, the Hospital asserted the position followed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Ohio State University and contended that the
"redistribution that is prohibited is the redistribution of activities, not the redistribution of
costs." Id; see also Ohio State Univ. v. Sullivan, 777 F. Supp. 582, 587 (S.D. Ohio 1991),
affd, 996 F.2d 112 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2731, and vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731
(1994) (holding that the "underlying purpose of the [anti-]redistribution principle is to limit
reimbursement to educational costs related to patient care"); supra notes 87-92 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Ohio State University decision).
167. Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33, at 20 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)
(emphasis omitted)).
168. Id. at 20-21 (citation omitted).
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related to [these] educational activities.' 69
The Court, however, rejected the Hospital's argument, finding it incon-
sistent with the plain language of the regulation.170 In addition, the Court
stated that even if it was consistent, administrative law principles would
require that the Secretary's interpretation be given controlling weight.'
The inquiry, according to the Court, is whether or not the Secretary's
interpretation is reasonable, not whether a better interpretation is offered
by the Hospital.'
2. The Secretary's Interpretation Contradicts Internal Policies
In its second argument, the Hospital attempted to overcome the defer-
ential tactics of the Court by alleging that the Secretary's interpretation
was inconsistent with her internal policies.173 As proof of the Secretary's
inconsistency, the Hospital offered internal operating guidelines issued by
the HCFA to instruct Providers how to claim costs for the purposes of
reimbursement. 74 Even though the memorandum detailed numerous
categories and amounts of GME expenses incurred by a medical school
which may be reimbursable to a Provider, it did not mention the anti-
redistribution limitation. 75 Thus, according to the Hospital:
If the Secretary's current interpretation of the regulation is cor-
rect, [the guideline] should have instructed intermediaries that
any related-party GME costs not previously claimed repre-
sented a prohibited redistribution. It did not. It is remarkable
that neither the concept of redistribution nor the relevant regu-
latory section is cited in the Secretary's internal guidelines for
the proper treatment of GME costs by teaching hospitals. This
absence is persuasive evidence that the Secretary's interpreta-
tion of section 413.85(c) is not a long-standing or consistent pol-
icy, but rather a recently-discovered tool for denying legitimate
169. Md at 20 (quoting Ohio State Univ., 777 F. Supp. at 587).
170. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2388.
171. Id (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
172. Id Here, the Court viewed the Secretary's construction as reasonable because
nothing in the language of the regulation indicates that the "redistribution of costs" only
applies to certain activities, such as classroom instruction. Id. Rather, according to the
Court, the regulation clearly indicates that any shifting of costs is prohibited. Id.
173. IM at 2388; Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33, at 21.
174. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2388 (citation omitted); Br. for Pet'r, Feb.
1994, supra note 33, at 22; Intermediary Letter, supra note 74, at 64a-66a.
175. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2388; Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33,
at 22; Intermediary Letter, supra note 74, at 64a-66a.
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reimbursement claims.' 76
The Court, however, rejected this argument. 177 Although the Court
admitted that an interpretation by the Secretary which conflicts with a
prior interpretation is "'entitled to considerably less deference' than a
consistently held view,"' 78 it failed to perceive the Hospital's evidence as
persuasive. 79 The Court stated that the Secretary's omission of the anti-
redistribution principle in the guidelines did not create a contrary policy
because the letter did not purport to be a complete list of all the possible
conditions that might be placed on the repayment of costs.' 80 Rather, the
letter specifically stated that it was only trying to review "a number of
situations.' 18 Thus, according to the Court, "[i]t is not surprising, then
that the letter did not address the anti-redistribution principle, and the
mere failure to address it hardly establishes an inconsistent policy on the
part of the Secretary."'' 1
3. The Secretary's Interpretation Is Inconsistent with Previous
Applications of the Regulation
In its final argument, the Hospital contended that the Secretary's inter-
pretation of section 413.85(c) is inconsistent with previous applications of
the regulation."8 3 According to the Hospital, if the Secretary's construc-
tion of the anti-redistribution regulation is correct, then the initial reim-
bursement to the Hospital in 1974 was actually a prohibited
"redistribution."'" This argument was based on the fact that even
though the Hospital had not historically claimed such costs, the Depart-
ment did not deny the Hospital's claim in 1974, nor did the Department
ever assert that any teaching hospital claiming GME costs for the first
176. Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33, at 22.
177. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2388.
178. Id. (citing I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (quoting Watt
v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981))).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. IM (quoting Intermediary Letter, supra note 74, at 64a). Specifically, the letter was
only trying to review "situations rais[ing] questions about the reasonableness of [medical
school faculty] costs as allowable hospital costs and the appropriateness of the bases used
in allocating them to the hospital." Id. (quoting Intermediary Letter, supra note 74, at 64a).
182. I& (footnote omitted).
183. Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33, at 21.
184. Id. at 21-22 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)). The Hospital did not receive
any GME reimbursement from 1966 to 1973. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2391
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Despite this fact, the Hospital was granted reimbursement for the
first time in 1974. Id.
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time, or simply claiming increased costs, was engaged in a prohibited
"redistribution." 18 5
The Court admitted that the Secretary's current construction may have
been inconsistent with previous applications of the regulation.'8 6 Never-
theless, the Court held that the Secretary's current interpretation was
valid."8 According to the Court, "[t]he Secretary is not estopped for
changing a view she believes to have been grounded upon a mistaken
legal interpretation," and "where the agency's interpretation... is at least
as plausible as competing ones, there is little, if any, reason not to defer to
its construction."'188
C. The Secretary's Interpretation Creates Irrational Disparities Among
Similarly Situated Providers
The United States Supreme Court, by rigidly complying with adminis-
trative law principles, failed to consider the logical ramifications of the
Secretary's construction. The interpretation offered by the Secretary cre-
ates disparities among similarly situated Providers. 189 For instance, sup-
pose, as the Hospital argued, Providers A, B, and C all had affiliated
medical schools incurring $1 million in GME expenses in Year X.19°
Prior to year X, Provider A had correctly claimed all of the GME-related
expenses paid by its affiliated medical school; Provider B had claimed
only fifty percent of the medical school's expenses; and Provider C had
claimed none of the medical school's expenses. 19' According to the Sec-
185. Br. for Pet'r, Feb. 1994, supra note 33, at 21 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)).
The costs recovered by the Hospital in 1974 were historically borne to a large extent by the
Medical School. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2391 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see
also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., [Oct.-Sept. 1989-90 Transfer Binder]
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCII) 1 38,353 (Jan. 18, 1990), affd, [March-Sept.. 1992
Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 40,294 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 1992),
affd, 993 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994) (recognizing that tuition and
educational grants to the Medical School funded the Hospital's pre-1974 GME activities).
However, based upon the Secretary's current construction of the anti-redistribution regula-
tion, the Hospital should not have received any financing because it had not received such
reimbursements since the inception of the Medicare program. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114
S. Ct. at 2391 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2389.
187. Il
188. Id (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 2161 (1993)).
189. Brief for American Hospital Association and Association of American Medical
Colleges as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22, Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
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retary, "past practice would be binding."'" Provider A would be reim-
bursed $1 million; Provider B would only recover $500,000; and Provider
C would receive nothing. 93 Thus, despite the fact that Provider C's pa-
tients received identical treatment as Provider A's patients, "[Provider] C
would have to suffer in Year X and for all other years because in prior
years it had waived its Medicare entitlement." 94
The interpretation offered by the Secretary creates enormous disadvan-
tages among Providers offering the same benefits to the Medicare pa-
tients they serve.' 95 It also produces an annual benefit for the federal
government based on a Provider's waiver in an earlier year.19 6 The Medi-
care statute does not support the creation of such irrational disparities. 97
According to the Medicare statute, "reasonable costs" are "the costs ac-
tually incurred, excluding therefrom any part of incurred cost found to be
unnecessary in the efficient delivery of needed health services."'198 Cer-
tainly, as suggested by the Hospital, the failure of Provider C to seek
reimbursement for a GME-related expense in an earlier year does not
render the cost "unnecessary in the efficient delivery of needed health
services."'199 "If the cost is necessary in [Provider] A's 'efficient delivery
of needed health services,' logically it must also be 'necessary' in [Pro-
vider] C's-whether or not [Provider] C waived its Medicare claim in
prior years. '200
Furthermore, based on the Secretary's construction, a Provider must
forfeit its right to recover otherwise allowable costs simply because it




195. Id, Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2395 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (1994). As articulated by Justice Thomas, the Secretary's construction "arbitrarily
subjects similarly situated Medicare [Piroviders, with identical levels of [GME reimburse-
ment], to disparate reimbursement, simply because one [P]rovider may have foregone re-
imbursement to which it was plainly entitled." Id. It is arbitrary on the part of the
Secretary to deny reimbursement to a hospital for an expense for which it was lawfully
entitled reimbursement simply because the hospital's accounting procedures failed to rec-
ognize all of the costs for which it could be reimbursed. Id.
196. Brief for AMA, supra note 189, at 22.
197. Id
198. Id (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1988)).
199. Id (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1988)).
200. Id. at 22-23 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1988)).
201. According to the Secretary's Brief, the issue presented in Thomas Jefferson Uni-
versity is: "Whether the Secretary reasonably determined that 42 C.F.R. 413.85(c) bars a
hospital providing Medicare services from obtaining reimbursement of otherwise reimburs-
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tional because it conditions the federal funding of GME on the past prac-
tices of a Provider. This would be akin to the Internal Revenue Service
denying "a deduction for interest on a home mortgage because a taxpayer
failed to claim the deduction in prior years.""2 2 Consequently, rather
than rectifying the Hospital's earlier failure to seek recovery for its allow-
able costs, the Secretary has exacerbated the problem by allowing inequi-
table levels of reimbursements among Providers furnishing the same
degree of benefits to the patients that they serve.
D. Justice Thomas' Dissent Examine the Context in which the
Regulation Appears
Justice Thomas turned to the Medicare regulations as a whole to sup-
port his conclusion that all costs incurred with respect to traditional edu-
cational activities are properly reimbursable under the Medicare
program.203 In the dissent's view, the proper construction of the anti-
redistribution principle could only be determined by analyzing the entire
able GME program costs that previously were absorbed by its affiliated medical school."
Br. for Resp't, Oct. 1993, supra note 24, at I (emphasis added). It cannot be disputed that
the activities for which the Hospital sought reimbursement were otherwise reimbursable
expenses. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381,2395 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the activities for which the Hospital sought reimbursement were
the type customarily carried on by teaching hospitals); see also Ohio State Univ. v. Sulli-
van, 777 F. Supp. 582, 587 (S.D. Ohio 1991), affd, 996 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1993), cert.
granted, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994), and vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994) (providing that custom-
ary.GME-related expenses include salaries of physicians, salaries of clerical and adminis-
trative staffs, and the cost of office space and supplies); Medical Education Passthrough,
supra note 2, at 4 (stating that Medicare has traditionally reimbursed Providers for the
salaries of residents, faculty, and support personnel, and the cost of classroom space,
equipment, and supplies). Nevertheless, the Secretary denied the Hospital's claim.
Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2383.
202. Brief for AMA, supra note 189, at 25-26; GME: Court Upholds HHS Interpreta-
tion, supra note 23, at 895. Furthermore:
If past practice is the criterion, it logically follows that a hospital which has mis-
takenly received GME reimbursement for unallowable costs in the past should
continue to be reimbursed for those costs. The Secretary would undoubtedly ob-
ject to making such payments, and she would, of course, be right. But it makes no
more sense to deny allowable costs because a hospital waived its lawful entitle-
ment in prior years than to reimburse unallowable costs because a hospital was
mistakenly reimbursed in prior years. Mistakes should be corrected, not
perpetuated.
Brief for AMA, supra note 189, at 26.
203. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2395 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(1994). The dissent also pointed to the fact that section 413.85(c) speaks in vague aspira-
tional terms, id at 2390, such as the "intent of the Medicare program," 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.85(c) (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, according to the dissent, the "Secretary
[should not be able] to transform ... what self-evidently are mere generalized expressions
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regulation together with the related-organization principle.2 4 Conse-
quently, the dissent concluded that "[section] 413.85(c)'s anti-redistribu-
tion principle simultaneously expresses an intent to fund educational
activities customarily conducted by teaching hospitals and disallows reim-
bursement for costs incurred by their affiliated educational units in con-
ducting educational programs not customarily or traditionally engaged in
by such hospitals."20
1. The Failure to Consider the Related-Organization Principle
Distorts Section 413.85(c)'s True Meaning
Under the related-organization regulation, a Provider will be reim-
bursed for the "costs applicable to services, facilities, and supplies fur-
nished to the [PIrovider by organizations related to the [P]rovider by
common ownership or control."20 6 Furthermore, items obtained by a
Provider from an organization that "is owned or controlled by the
owner(s) of the [P]rovider, [are treated as if] ... the items are obtained
from [the Provider] itself., 2°7 Together, these two provisions stand for
the proposition that "transactions between [teaching hospitals and their
affiliated medical schools] ... are not arm's length transactions, but
rather transfers between entities which are essentially alter egos."2 08
of intent into substantive rules of reimbursability." Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at
2390 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
204. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2394 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
205. Id. Thus, because the activities for which the Hospital sought reimbursement were
clearly customary educational activities, the dissent would have held that the anti-redistri-
bution regulation provides no basis for denying the Hospital's requested reimbursement.
Id. at 2395.
206. 42 C.F.R. § 413.17(a) (1994). Specifically, section 413.17(a) provides that:
Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, costs applicable to services,
facilities, and supplies furnished to the [Plrovider by organizations related to the
[PIrovider by common ownership or control are includable in the allowable cost of
the [PIrovider at the cost to the related organization. However, such costs must
not exceed the price of comparable services, facilities, or supplies that could be
purchased elsewhere.
42 C.F.R. § 413.17(a) (emphasis added).
207. 42 C.F.R. § 413.17(c)(2) (1994). Specifically, section 413.17(c)(2) provides that:
If the [P]rovider obtains items of services, facilities, or supplies from an organiza-
tion, even though it is a separate legal entity, and the organization is owned or
controlled by the owner(s) of the [P]rovider, in effect the items are obtained from
itself.... Therefore, reimbursable cost should include the costs for these items at
the cost to the supplying organization.
42 C.F.R. § 413.17(c)(2) (emphasis added).
208. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 15, Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381
(1994) (No. 93-120) (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.17(c)(2) (1994)).
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As alter egos, it would be illogical, as the Secretary's construction
would have it, 0 9 to construe the shifting of costs from an affiliated medi-
cal school to a teaching hospital as a prohibited redistribution.21 There
can be no shifting of costs when, in reality, only one organization ex-
ists.211 Consequently, the Secretary erred in analyzing the term "'redis-
tribution' wholly divorced from the context in which it appears. '212 By
rigidly defining the anti-redistribution regulation, the Secretary failed to
consider the plain meaning of the related-organization principle. This
failure exemplifies the shortcomings of the Secretary's construction:
rather than adopting an interpretation that takes into account the entire
Medicare scheme, the Secretary's narrow interpretation is a distortion of
the anti-redistribution regulation's true meaning.21 3
IV. CONCLUSION
The importance of GME in enhancing the quality of patient care has
been recognized since the beginning of the Medicare program. Despite
this fact, the Court, in Thomas Jefferson University, deferred to the Secre-
tary's interpretation of the anti-redistribution regulation and restricted a
Provider's ability to receive reimbursement for any cost previously paid
209. The Secretary asserts that section 413.85(c) is more specific than the related-organ-
ization principle, and therefore, should control. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
[March-Sept. 1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 40,294, at
30,966 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 1992), affd, 993 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2381
(1994). However, given section 413.85(c)'s precatory language, this can be disputed. See
Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2395 (Thomas, J., dissenting); supra note 203. While
the anti-redistribution regulation speaks in terms of the Medicare program's "intent", 42
C.F.R. § 413.85(c), the related-organization principle expressly states that "costs applicable
to services ... furnished to the [P]rovider by [related] organizations... are includable in
the allowable cost of the [P]rovider," 42 C.F.R. § 413.17(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
210. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 208, at 15.
211. See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Ohio, Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Minne-
sota, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah and Virginia in Support of Petitioner
at 20, Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994) (No. 93-120).
212. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 114 S. Ct. at 2394 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 42
C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1994)). According to the majority, the anti-redistribution regulation
can be broken down into two clauses with the second clause "impos[ing] the relevant re-
striction on cost redistribution." Id. at 2387. However, as the Hospital argued and the
dissent concurred, the proper interpretation of section 413.85(c) can only be derived by
reading the entire regulatory framework together with the related-organization principle.
IdL at 2394.
213. Id at 2394 (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the Secretary's con-
struction of the anti-redistribution regulation "is premised on a distortion of the text of the
regulation enunciating [it].... and it is the text... which must be given controlling effect."
IaS (citation omitted).
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for by its affiliated medical school. While an isolated reading of the
words of the anti-redistribution regulation may lend support to the Secre-
tary's interpretation, a careful analysis of the Medicare regulations as a
whole proves that her construction is a distortion. In citing to administra-
tive law principles, the Court failed to recognize the impracticalities of
the Secretary's interpretation. Instead, the Court has adhered to a defini-
tion that creates enormous disadvantages among Providers offering the
same degree of benefit to the Medicare patients they serve.
Paul R. Koster
